Our seminars usually take place on tuesdays from 10:30 to 11:45, but many exceptions exist.
Venue : Jean Monnet University at Saint-Etienne, Campus Tréfilerie. Sciences Po Lyon building (77 rue Michelet Saint-Etienne) Conference room : Salle du Conseil (2nd floor) Video conference on demand Organization : Julie Ferrand and Aymeric Lardon
Tuesday, September 27, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Margherita Comola, University Paris-Saclay
Title : Experimental Evidence on Multilateral Blind Bargaining
Abstract : We conduct a laboratory experiment to study a decentralized market where players engage in multiple simultaneous trading games. We implement different trading protocols which allow players to keep all information about their evaluations and bids private, and revise their bids if they wish so. We show that protocols allowing for bargaining dramatically improve efficiency with respect to the benchmark scenario of a sealed-bid multilateral blind auction, mainly to the benefit of players rather than the silent auctioneer. This is because participants seek to reveal information through a gradual bidding-up strategy that favors bargaining environments. Aggregate efficiency nonetheless suffers from the fact that participants raise their bids gradually, buyers bargain harder than sellers, and some players over-bargain to appropriate a larger share of the unknown surplus.
Tuesday, October 18, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Gaétan de Rassenfosse, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Title : The commercialization of DoD-SBIR patents : A counterfactual analysis
Abstract : The paper proposes a novel, web-based approach to innovation policy
evaluation. The approach overcomes several limitations affecting established valuation methods used in the literature. We implement it to study the impact of the U.S. DoD-SBIR program on technology commercialization. We start by identifying the universe of USPTO patents that acknowledge support by the SBIR program. We then
track whether these patents are mentioned in relation to commercial products in a virtual patent marking page available on the recipient’s website. We interpret the latter event as signal of commercialization. Finally, we create a group of control patents and we compare the commercialization probability of SBIR-funded and control inventions.
The results support the view that the SBIR program is quite effective at stimulating the commercialization of federally-funded scientific discoveries.
Tuesday, November 29, 11h00-12h00 Speaker : Paola Labrecciosa, Monash University
Title : A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks
Abstract : The paper presents a novel approach based on differential games to the study of criminal networks. We extend the static crime network game (Ballester et al., 2006, 2010) to a dynamic setting. First, we determine the relationship between the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) and the vector of Bonacich centralities. The established proportionality between the Nash equilibrium and the Bonacich centrality in the static game does not hold in general in the dynamic setting. Next, we provide an explicit characterization of equilibrium strategies, and conduct comparative dynamic analysis with respect to the network size, network density, and the marginal expected punishment. Contrary to the static game, where aggregate equilibrium increases with network size and density, in the dynamic setting, more criminals or more connected criminals can lead to a decrease in total crime, both in the short run and at the steady state. We also examine another novel issue in the network theory literature, i.e., the existence of a voracity effect, occurring when an increase in the implicit growth rate of total wealth in the economy lowers economic growth. We do identify the presence of such a voracity effect in our setting. Finally, we reconsider the problem of identifying the key player in the network, and show that, in general, the key player in the static and the dynamic setting differ.
Tuesday, November 29, 14h00-15h00 Speaker : Ulysse Lojkine, Ecole d’Economie de Paris
Title : A general power index
Abstract : I propose a general power index in games. The power of an agent over an outcome is understood as the equilibrium effect on the outcome of variations in the agent’s preferences. I show that the new index, ∆, has the following properties : (i) classic measures of freedom of choice are a special case of the ∆ index in the context of individual choice ; (ii) the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices are special cases of the ∆ index in the context of binary voting games ; (iii) in bargaining games, the ∆ index of a player combines his outside option and other parameters ; (iv) the ∆ index allows a generalization of the Barry decomposition of success between power and luck to all unidimensional spatial games ; (v) the ∆ power of a firm on its price is related to its Lerner index, but also to its technology and to the potential entry of competitors ; (vi) in a simple competitive exchange setting, each agent has zero ∆ power on the equilibrium price but a ∆ power density can be defined, which, under some assumptions on preferences, is proportional to the agents’ wealth.
Tuesday, December 6, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Aurélien Baillon, Emlyon business school, department of quantitative finance and economics
Title :
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Tuesday, December 13, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Ngoc-Sang Pham, EM Normandie
Title : Impacts of (individual and aggregate) productivity and credit shocks on equilibrium aggregate production Abstract : In a market economy, the aggregate production level depends not only on the aggregate variables but also on the distribution of individual characteristics (e.g., productivity, credit limit, ...). We point out that, due to financial frictions the equilibrium aggregate production may be non-monotonic in both individual productivity and credit limit. By consequence, the emergence of some firms (for example, improving productivity or relaxing credit limit) may not necessarily be beneficial to economic development.
Tuesday, January 17, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Chantal Marlats, Université Paris 2, LEMMA
Title :
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Tuesday, January 24, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Rémy Oddou, Université Paris Ouest, EconomiX
Title : Inequalities and segregation : can welfarist local governments struggle against both simultaneously ?
Abstract : This paper analyses how progressive taxation schemes, implemented by local welfarist government, affect the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction
formation, using a model where local jurisdictions produce a local public good,
financed by a progressive tax on households’ wealth. A jurisdiction is composed
of all the households that live in the same place. Local taxation parameters are
determined so as to maximize a social welfare function. Households can vote
with their feet, which means that they can choose to move to the jurisdiction
that offers the package ”tax - amount of public good” that provides the highest
utility level. The main result of this article is the proof that the maximin criterion is more segregative than the utilitarian one. Consequently, it suggests that local governments can not simultaneously struggle against inequalities and
segregation.
Tuesday, January 31, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Rémy Cazabet, Université Lyon 1, LIRIS
Title : Data-driven analysis of Bitcoin transactions
Abstract : An interesting property of most cryptocurrencies, and Bitcoin in particular, is that the whole history of transactions is accessible to anyone. The objective of the ANR JCJC project BITUNAM (Bitcoin User Network Analysis and Mining) I’m leading is to collect and analyse the transactions on the Bitcoin Blockchain. In this presentation, I’ll introduce what we can and cannot see in that data, introduce the principle of some machine learning techniques we use to better interpret those transactions, and present some examples of usages of transaction flow tracking.
Tuesday, February 21, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Dorothée Charlier, Université Savoie Mont-Blanc, LIRIS
Title : Utility Services Poverty : Addressing the Problem of Household Deprivation in Mayotte
Abstract : Among the 17 sustainable development goals adopted by the United Nations in 2015 to eradicate poverty are ensuring (i) “availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation” and (ii) access to modern energy sources. One problem for Mahorais households is access to safe, clean and affordable essential utility services, such as electricity, water and sewerage. We define a new concept of utility services poverty (basic utility services deprivation) based on the theoretical capabilities framework of Sen and Nussbaum. Using a latent class model to evaluate utility services poverty in Mayotte Island, we identify households that are poor in utility services and characterize four household profiles on a scale of vulnerability/poverty. We demonstrate that access to water is more discriminatory than access to electricity in Mayotte. The top priority in fighting utility services poverty should be access to water and sanitary facilities. We show that utility services poverty and income poverty are distinct phenomena. Public policies that aim to support only the income poor do not solve the problems of access to utility services in Mayotte. Policies should be implemented not according to income but to facilitate water and energy access and improve basic hygiene conditions.
Tuesday, February 28, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Manuel Foerster, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics
Title : Strategic use of social media influencer marketing
Abstract : We build a model of social media influencer marketing in which a firm may hire influencers to inform consumers of an innovation. Influencers generate
sales through purchases of their followers and followers’ social networks. While
rational consumers learn product quality before purchase, naïve consumers
don’t and instead follow the advice of influencers and peers. In equilibrium
influencers price according to their contribution to sales, which depends on the
number of followers. In turn, the firm hires an influencer if her contribution
to sales exceeds the costs of producing the endorsement. The quality of the
endorsement and the product price is such that it maximizes industry profits.
In particular, the firm will exploit consumers’ na ̈ıvit ́e and make influencers
provide exaggerated endorsements along with overpricing of the product if
product quality is relatively low. We further show how equilibrium profits
depend on the players’ relative market power.
Tuesday, March 28, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Pierre Mohnen, Maastricht University
Title :
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Tuesday, April 4, 10h30-11h45 Speaker : Gaëtan Fournier, Aix-Marseille Université, AMSE
Title : Political competition with costly deviations
Abstract :
Past Seminars 2021-2022, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Saint-Etienne
Bitcoin : New Financial Order or Libertarian Dystopia ? An Answer from The Past : Scotland 1727-1845 - A Critical Review of Decentralised Systems of Private Money Supply
Influences of German economics on British late-nineteenth century economists, with a special focus on historicism and on its impact on John Neville Keynes’ 1890 The Scope and Method of Political Economy
Our seminars usually take place on tuesdays from 10:30 to 11:45, but many exceptions exist.
